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1 Introduction
Neoclassical finance theory predicts that distressed firms have strong incentives to substitute
low risk assets for highly risky ones due to the conflict of interest between stockholders and
bondholders (e.g., Berk and DeMarzo (2011), Brealey, Myers, and Alan (2012)). In theory, such
behavior can substantially increase the value of equity at the cost of that of debt (Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Galai and Masulis (1976), Green and Talmor (1986)). Somewhat surprisingly
therefore, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2011, p.676) note that, “although this argument
has been taken to be an important consideration [. . .], there has been very little direct evidence
of risk-shifting in practice”. The general lack of evidence may be attributable to risk-shifting
being hard to measure or only creating negligible benefits (Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Parrino
and Weisbach (1999)). Another, so far unstudied, possibility is that creditors can often engage
in actions preventing the managers of distressed firms from risk-shifting.
In this study, we examine whether creditors can prevent risk-shifting from occurring. One
major problem with our research question is that it is impossible to empirically measure all ways
through which creditors could control the investment policies of distressed firms. For example,
creditors may control investment behavior by imposing formal restrictions, such as capital ex-
penditure covenants (Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009)). However, formal restrictions are probably
less effective than informal ones, such as, for example, the threat to not roll over existing short-
term debt if the managers of a firm engage in actions detrimental to creditors’ well-being. This
threat should be taken seriously as most distressed firms require fresh capital on an ongoing
basis (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002), Bhagat, Moyen, and Suh (2005)). To circum-
vent the above problem, we resort to an indirect method to test our hypothesis. Our method
starts from the auxiliary assumption that creditors are only able to prevent risk-shifting if they
can correctly identify a firm as distressed. If this were true, then an implication would be that
the predictability of distress should condition risk-shifting behavior. In particular, only those
firms for which distress was hard to detect ex-ante should have risk-shifted.
To facilitate our tests, we measure true distress using forward-looking variables indicating
whether or not a firm files for bankruptcy in the next couple of years. Our proxy variables for
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true distress are motivated by evidence in Westerfield (1971) and Clark and Weinstein (1983)
suggesting that the performance of future bankrupt firms deteriorates long before their formal
filing dates. In contrast, our measure of distress perceived by creditors at the time is Altman’s
(1968) Z-score. The Z-score is popular among market participants to measure distress risk,
and it only relies on data known to market participants at the start of our sample period. Our
approach is closely connected to studies forecasting corporate bankruptcy (Shumway (2001),
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004), Bharath and Shumway (2008)). In partic-
ular, we classify as distressed firms able (unable) to conceal their health issues those future
bankrupt firms attracting large (small) errors in bankruptcy forecasting exercises. Our ap-
proach is also consistent with the market sometimes failing to timely identify distress due to
earnings manipulation (Rosner (2003), Charitou, Lambertides, and Trigeorgis (2007)).
To analyze one specific case of risk-shifting, we follow the methodology of Eisdorfer (2008)
and regress scaled capital expenditures on market or on industry volatility and controls. Us-
ing a real options model,Eisdorfer (2008) reports that, when aggregate uncertainty is high,
healthy firms maximize shareholder value by slowing down investments and thus increasing to-
tal firm value (also, see McDonald and Siegel (1986)). In contrast, distressed firms maximize
shareholder value by speeding up investments and thus creating a large wealth transfer from
creditors to shareholders. An implication is that, while healthy firms should attract a negative,
distressed firms should attract a zero or positive coefficient of capital expenditures on volatil-
ity. So far, Eisdorfer’s (2008) method is the only one producing some evidence suggesting that
firms risk-shift. It is thus interesting to examine whether, even when using his methodology, we
find support for creditors sometimes being able to control risk-shifting problems.
If creditors’ ability to correctly identify distress conditions risk-shifting, we would expect
the results obtained from Eisdorfer’s (2008) methodology to greatly vary across robustness
tests implicitly emphasizing different sets of firms. Using different firm samples, proxy vari-
ables for capital expenditures and uncertainty, control variables and estimation methods, we
document strong support for this conjecture. In particular, we show that both the sign and the
significance level of the relation between capital expenditures and aggregate volatility for both
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firms classified as healthy and distressed varies significantly across our robustness tests. More
importantly, only in a minority of cases do firms classified as healthy attract a negative and sig-
nificant, while firms classified as distressed attract a zero or positive and significant, coefficient.
We then repeat the former tests explicitly allowing the relation to vary across healthy firms per-
ceived as healthy, healthy firms perceived as distressed, distressed firms perceived as healthy
and distressed firms perceived as distressed. Results are striking. While distressed firms per-
ceived as distressed never produce evidence supporting risk-shifting, those perceived as healthy
always do, with this result being extremely stable across the robustness tests.
Two concerns remain. First, we might not be able to correctly distinguish between distressed
firms that were correctly identified as distressed by creditors at the time, and those that were
not. To offer some support for our classification scheme, we show that the firms that we classify
as distressed, but perceived as healthy, attract far more favorable analyst recommendations
than those that we classify as distressed, and also perceived as distressed. Second, our analysis
does not indicate how creditors are able to control the investment policies of distressed firms.
To shed some more light on this issue, we show that distressed firms perceived as distressed are
more strongly exposed to covenants restricting capital expenditures than those perceived as
healthy. We also report that distressed firms raise far more external capital (both equity and
debt) than healthy firms, implying that they should be more susceptible to creditor threats.
As a final step, we further corroborate our former results by showing that they continue to
hold in non-US markets, namely Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.
Our article contributes to a growing literature studying risk-shifting. Many studies report
a negative relation between the capital expenditures of healthy firms and several proxies for
uncertainty (Episcopos (1995), Leahy and Whited (1995), Kim and Kung (2011)). However, so
far there was little evidence that distressed firms risk-shift (Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Parrino
and Weisbach (1999)). This lack of evidence cannot be exclusively attributed to distressed firms
lacking the capital necessary to invest. Bhagat, Moyen, and Suh (2005) find that, while around
60% of distressed firms with operating losses downsize their investments as their financial
health deteriorates, the remaining firms increase their investments using new capital. Similarly,
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Whited (1992) and Chava and Roberts (2008) show that financing constraints often force
distressed firms to cut their capital expenditure, but not necessarily to zero. Another reason
could be that, as health deteriorates, creditors impose capital expenditure covenants, thereby
constraining managers’ investment policies (Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009)).
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our methodology and data. In
Section 3, we offer our empirical results. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Methodology & Data
2.1 Methodology
Eisdorfer (2008) uses the following regression model to test whether distressed firms risk-shift:
Investmentit = α0 + α1PercDistressi,t−1 + β1σet−1
+β2PercDistressi,t−1σet−1 + γXi,t−1 + θYt−1 + it, (1)
where Investmentit is scaled capital expenditures, PercDistressi,t−1 is the market’s view of
the firm’s distress, σet−1 is either anticipated market or industry volatility, Xi,t−1 and Yt−1 are,
respectively, vectors containing firm-specific and macroeconomic control variables, and [α0, α1]
′,
[β0, β1]
′, γ and θ are vectors containing the parameters. While investment is measured over the
current fiscal year, all exogenous variables are measured at its start.
Following from real options considerations (McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)), unlevered firms should postpone investments when aggregate uncertainty is high, pro-
ducing a negative relation between investment and uncertainty (β1 +β2) in model (1). Eisdorfer
(2008) documents that leverage can reverse this conclusion. Using a real options model featuring
debt, he reports that, when leverage is high, managers acting in the best interest of sharehold-
ers behave optimally by increasing investments as aggregate volatility rises. The intuition for
this result follows from Mason and Merton’s (1985) insight that the equity claim is a call option
on firm value. While postponing the investment increases total firm value even when leverage is
high, speeding it up leads to a large wealth transfer from creditors to shareholders, giving man-
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agers incentives to risk-shift. As a result, sufficiently distressed firms should produce a zero (if the
two opposing effects cancel out) or even a negative (if the wealth transfer dominates the increase
in firm value) effect of uncertainty on investment in model (1).
One issue with model (1) is that it implicitly assumes that firms having incentives to risk-
shift can always act upon these. In other words, even when creditors are fully aware of the firm’s
poor health and thus the possibility of wealth being transferred from them to shareholders, they
remain idle. In practice, creditors should likely find ways to protect their stake in the company
either through formal or informal means. One informal means could be the threat to not lend
more money to the firm. This threat is probably effective because most distressed firms require
new capital on a continuous basis to survive (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002), Bhagat,
Moyen, and Suh (2005)). To test whether creditors can keep managers from risk-shifting if they
correctly identify a firm as distressed, we extent model (1) as follows:
Investmentit = α0 + α1PercDistressi,t−1 + β1σet−1 + β2PercDistressi,t−1σ
e
t−1
+β3TrueDistressi,t−1σet−1 + β4(TrueDistressi,t−1 ·
PercDistressi,t−1)σet−1 + γXi,t−1 + θYt−1 + it, (2)
where TrueDistressi,t−1 captures the firm’s true distress. If creditors can control managerial
investmentbehaviorupon identifyingafirmasdistressed, theeffectofuncertaintyon investments
(
∑4
i=1 βi) should be negative, as for healthy firms. However, if they misclassify a distressed firm
as healthy, then the managers of this firm should be able to risk-shift, leading to a positive effect of
uncertainty on investments. Unfortunately, it is impossible to directly observe true distress, even
ex-post. We thus indirectly proxy for true distress using dummy variables indicating how many
(fiscal) years a future bankrupt firm is away from its filing date. Underlying this approximation
is the assumption that distress builds up slowly over time, that is, that it is the result of a long
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sequence of managerial errors and chance events. We can thus re-write model (2) as:
Investmentit = α0 + α1PercDistressi,t−1 + β1σet−1 + β2PercDistressi,t−1σ
e
t−1
+β
′
3T[−1;−2]σ
e
t−1 + β
′′
3T[−3;−6]σ
e
t−1 + β
′′′
3 T[−7;−10]σ
e
t−1
+β
′
4T[−1;−2]PercDistressi,t−1σ
e
t−1
+β
′′
4T[−3;−6]PercDistressi,t−1σ
e
t−1
+β
′′′
4 T[−7;−10]PercDistressi,t−1σ
e
t−1 + γXi,t−1 + θYt−1 + it, (3)
where T[−1;−2], T[−3;−6] and T[−7;−10] are dummy variables equal to one if a firm is two years,
three to six years and seven to ten years, respectively, away from filing for bankruptcy and zero
otherwise. On first thought, a problem of model (3) is that it incorrectly classifies distressed firms
that manage to avoid filing for bankruptcy (e.g, due to risk-shifting) as healthy firms. However,
if these incorrectly-classified distressed firms are also perceived as distressed, creditors should
closely monitor their investments, implying no bias in the association between investments and
uncertainty for healthy firms perceived to be distressed. If they are instead perceived as healthy,
theyareable to risk-shift, therebyprobablybiasingupward the relationbetween investmentsand
uncertainty for healthy firms perceived to be healthy. This bias makes it less likely that we find
any significant differences in investment behavior across healthy and distressed firms.
2.2 Proxy Variables
We use the following proxy variables in models (1) and (3). Consistent with Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we measure investments (Investmentit) using the ratio
of capital expenditures to start-of-period gross plant, property and equipment (capx/ppegt) or
that of capital expenditures to start-of-period total assets (capx/at).1 To measure aggregate
uncertainty (σet−1), we use a GARCH(1,1) model to estimate the volatility of the CRSP value-
weighted market index or 30 value-weighted industry indexes over the next (fiscal) year. The 30
industries are defined according to the classification scheme on Kenneth French’s website. We
1The CRSP/COMPUSTAT data item identifiers are given in parentheses.
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recursively estimate the GARCH(1,1) model over the sample period from June 1927 to December
2008, with the first recursive window ending in December 1979.
Figure 1 plots the GARCH volatility forecast for the market index and the average volatility
forecast for the 30 industries. While differences in diversification imply that the average volatil-
ity forecast for the 30 industries is higher than the volatility forecast for the market index, the
two series are strongly correlated. However, underlying the average volatility forecast for the 30
industries, there are great cross-sectional variations, implying that the market and the industry
volatility forecasts should not always yield identical conclusions. To better judge the reason-
ability of the out-of-sample GARCH(1,1) estimates, we also plot the VIX volatility index and
the NBER recession periods. Conforming to our expectations, the GARCH estimates and the
VIX index are highly correlated (correlation around 0.60), and the GARCH estimates peak in
economic recessions (the 1990 crisis, the burst of the Internet bubble, etc.).
As discussed, we use dummy variables indicating the distance-to-the filing date to measure
true distress (T[−1;−2], T[−3;−6] and T[−7;−10]). In contrast, we approximate the market’s view of
distress (PercDistressi,t−1) using Altman’s Z-score. The Z-score is defined as:
Zscore = 1.2(WC/TA) + 1.4(RE/TA) + 3.3(EBIT/TA) + 0.6(E/D) + 0.999(S/TA),
where WC is working capital (wcap), RE are retained earnings (re), EBIT is earnings before
interest and taxes (ebit), E is the market value of equity (prcc f), D is the book value of total
liabilities (csho), S is sales (sale) and TA is the book value of total assets (at). We then set
PercDistress equal to one if the Z-score is below 1.81 (and the firm is perceived to be in financial
difficulties) and zero otherwise. The cut-off point of 1.81 is taken from Altman (1968).2 Setting
PercDistress equal to the monotonic transformation of the Z-score used by Hillegeist, Keating,
Cram, and Lundstedt (2004) does not materially affect our conclusions.
We use several firm-specific controls to capture other effects conditioning investment behav-
2Of the future bankrupt firms, more than 50% are not correctly identified as distressed by the Z-score up
to two years prior to the bankruptcy filing date. This proportion decreases to 49% and 38% two and one
year prior to the bankruptcy filing date, respectively. This result shows that many distressed firms are able
to conceal their financial difficulties, at least in their accounting information.
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ior. We measure firm size, Size, as the natural logarithm of total assets (at) deflated by the CPI
and expressed in 2008 US dollars. Market-to-Book is the ratio of the market value of equity to the
book value of equity (prcc f×csho/ceq). Market Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities over the
sum of total liabilities and market value of equity (lt/(lt+prcc f×csho)). Cash Flow is the ratio
of income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization to the start-of-period
gross property, plant, and equipment ((ibc+dpc)/ppegt). The market-to-book ratio is normally
used to proxy for the marginal q, a theoretical measure of the firm’s investment opportunities
(Cleary (1999), Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007)). The cash flow proxy is included to control for
internal liquidity (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)). The remaining firm control variables
address potential omitted variables biases due to the market-to-book ratio being only a crude
proxy for the marginal q (Chava and Roberts (2008, pp.2102-2103)).
We also use several macroeconomic measures likely determining investment policy, such
as annual GDP growth (GDP growth), the three-month T-bill rate (Interest), the yield spread
between Baa and Aaa-rated corporate bond portfolios (Spread) and the NBER recession dummy
(Recession). Macroeconomic variables are included in investment models to control for the effect
of business cycle fluctuations (see, e.g., Episcopos (1995)).
2.3 Data
We collect the names and filing dates of 1,610 public US firms that filed for Chapter 7 or 11
between 1983 and 2009 from bankruptcydata.com. Market data are from CRSP, and accounting
data are from COMPUSTAT. We retrieve data on GDP growth (USWD3QBGR) and the T-bill
rate (USDI91TBR) from DataStream. The yields on AAA and BBB-rated securities are from
the website of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, and the recession periods are
from the NBER website. To avoid that outliers affect our conclusions, we winsorize the firm-level
analysis variables (including those used to construct the Z-score, but excluding the Z-score itself)
at the top and bottom one percentiles constructed using the whole sample.
Unfortunately, our bankruptcy filing data are largely incomplete prior to 1990. For example,
although Chava and Jarrow (2004) report 510 bankruptcies during the period from 1983 to 1989,
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our data feature only 62 in the same period. As a result, while we study the sample period from
1980 to 2008, we exclude from our sample firms that disappear from CRSP/COMPUSTAT prior
to 1990 without being classified as bankrupt according to our data source. This strategy ensures
that our sample does not include firms that went bankrupt between 1980 and 1990, but that are
missing from our bankruptcy filing list. For reasons of comparability, we also exclude financial
firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).
We have complete data on 6,906 firm-year observations (or 1,132 firm observations) for firms
that are within ten years of filing for bankruptcy (the distressed firms) and 68,401 firm-year
observations (or 6,157 firm observations) for firms that are more than ten years away from filing
for bankruptcy (the healthy firms).
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Summary Statistics
In Panel A of Table I, we compare the properties of our main analysis variables across samples
of firms filing for bankruptcy within the next ten years (the distressed firms) and those not filing
for bankruptcy (the healthy firms). We use t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to examine
the difference in means and medians across these two groups. The samples differ in the expected
way. The size of an average healthy firm is $1.3 billion, as measured by the book value of assets,
whereas it is $0.64billion foranaveragedistressedfirm. Thus, theaveragedistressedfirmisabout
two times smaller than the average healthy one. On average, the distressed firms command an
investment ratio (using PP&E as deflator) of 25.5%, while the healthy firms only attract one of
21.5%. However, the difference is mainly attributable to skewness, that is, when considering the
median, healthy and distressed firms invest to a similar degree (around 11-12%). The similar
investment ratios are interesting, because they vividly show that distressed firms do not lack the
capital to invest. Distressed firms also have higher average market leverage (45.7% compared to
33.0% for healthy firms) and experience larger operating losses (i.e., the average operating cash
flow ratio is -0.85 and -0.02 for distressed and healthy firms, respectively).
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[Please insert Table I about here]
Panel B reports the same descriptive statistics for firms with a Z-score above 1.81 (those
perceived to be distressed) and those with one below 1.81 (those perceived to be healthy), with
the Z-score measured at the start of the fiscal year. Comparing Panels A and B, we notice that
firms perceived to be distressed do not perform as poorly as those later filing for bankruptcy
(e.g., compare their operating cash flows). Nevertheless, they often have lower market-to-book,
but higher leverage ratios than the firms in Panel A, probably because of more depressed equity
values. Of great importance is also the finding that firms perceived to be distressed do not only
invest far less than firms perceived to be healthy (0.149 versus 0.234), but also far less than
those firms later filing for bankruptcy (0.255). This finding suggests creditors can successfully
restrict the investment behavior of firms perceived to be distressed, but also that distressed firms
managing to conceal their health issues can continue to invest aggressively.
To further contrast distressed firms able to conceal their health issues with those not able
to, Table II splits the distressed firms into those correctly classified by the Z-score (Panel A)
and those not (Panel B). For each group, it then offers median values for our analysis variables
for each of the final ten years before the bankruptcy filing date. Similar to before, firms able to
conceal their health issues invest significantly more than those unable to conceal them over the
entire ten year period. The median investment ratio (using PP&E as deflator) of the distressed
firms with a Z-score below 1.81 (the ones perceived as healthy) are about 6-7% higher than
those of the distressed firms with a Z-score above 1.81 during the three years prior to the filing
date. Again likely due to higher equity values, the incorrectly-classified distressed firms attract
higher market-to-book ratios, a greater size and lower leverage ratios than the correctly-classified
ones. The incorrectly-classified distressed firms also command relatively higher operating cash
flows, suggesting that their health issues are not (yet) reflected in their performance. This may
be one reason for why the market is unable to correctly classify these firms.
[Please insert Table II about here]
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3.2 Regression Analysis
Estimation of Model (1)
Table III offers the results from estimating model (1). To avoid multi-collinearity problems
arising from the fact that the macroeconomic controls are often extremely highly correlated,
we only employ GDP growth in the current estimations, but use more comprehensive sets of
macroeconomic controls later onwards.3 We estimate model (1) using OLS and GLS with fixed
industry effects (FEGLS). Using OLS, standard errors are clustered by four-digit SIC codes and
year and thus account for cross-sectional dependence in residuals belonging to the same industry
or year (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011)). The FEGLS method uses heteroscedasticity-
robust (White) standard errors and has the advantage that parameter estimates are constructed
takingaccountof thecorrelation structureof the residuals. Ourdiscussions emphasize the results
obtained from the FEGLS method, unless stated otherwise.
[Please insert Table III about here]
Panel A reports coefficient estimates and Panel B sums of coefficient estimates indicating
the effect of volatility on investment for firms perceived to be healthy (β1) and firms perceived
to be distressed (β1 + β2). Using FEGLS and industry volatilities, the coefficient estimate on
volatility is close to zero (β1 = −0.060, p-value = 0.40), while the one on the interaction term
between volatility and perceived distress is significantly negative (β2 = −0.477, p-value <
0.000). Overall, the insignificant β1 coefficient suggests that aggregate volatility does not affect
the investment behavior of firms perceived to be healthy. However, the significantly negative
sum of β1 and β2 (−0.536, p-value < 0.000) indicates that firms perceived to be distressed
scale down investments when aggregate uncertainty increases (Panel B). Similarly, using OLS in
combination with either market or industry volatilities, the β1 coefficient is either close to zero
or significantly positive, while the β2 coefficient is always insignificantly negative.
Although real options models suggest that healthy firms should postpone, while distressed
firms should speed up, investments when aggregate uncertainty increases, if anything at all, our
3In particular, the correlation coefficients between Spread and Recession is 0.64, that between Spread and
Interest is -0.50 and that between Spread and E[σmkt] is 0.62.
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empirical results indicate that the opposite occurs in practice. Our findings may be seen as sur-
prising, giventhatourestimationsare similar to thosereported inEisdorfer (2008). Nevertheless,
Eisdorfer (2008) finds a significant negative relation between investments and uncertainty for
healthy firms, but a significant positive one for distressed firms.
To analyze whether variations in research design drive the different conclusions, we estimate
five modified versions of model (1). Modification 1 replacesGDP growth by the macroeconomic
controls originally employed in Eisdorfer (2008), Interest, Spread and Recession. In Modifica-
tion 2, we include no macroeconomic controls. Modification 3-5 study alternative investment
measures, advocated by, for example, Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), and Coles, Daniel,
and Naveen (2006). Modification 3 scales capital expenditures by total assets. Modification 4
subtracts cash receipts from PP&E sales from capital expenditures and thus considers net in-
vestments (capx−sppe). Modification 5 analyzes total investments, defined as the sum of capital
expenditure, research and development (R&D) expense, and cash acquisition expenditure net
of the cash receipts from PP&E sales (capx+xrd+acq−sppe). As before, we estimate the mod-
ifications using market or industry volatilities and OLS or FEGLS (only FEGLS estimates are
reported). As no modification is major, favouring one of them above another should largely be
at the empiricist’s discretion.
Table IV reports the relation between investment and uncertainty for firms perceived to be
healthy (β1) and those perceived to be distressed (β1+β2), without repeating other coefficient es-
timates. Although the estimation specifications differ only slightly, they produce large variations
in sign and significance level of the relation between investment and uncertainty for both healthy
and distressed firms. Only modification 1 in conjunction with industry volatilities leads to results
somewhat similar to those reported in Eisdorfer (2008) (in bold). This estimation generates a
negative and significant relation for firms perceived as healthy (β1 = −0.224, p−value = 0.003)
and an insignificant relation for firms perceived as distressed (β1 + β2 = −0.516, p− value close
to 1). Not a single estimation produces a significantly positive effect for firms that are perceived
to be distressed. More remarkable, firms perceived to be healthy generate effects ranging from
significantly positive to significantly negative. Overall, the table suggests that minor modifica-
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tions to (i) the investment measure, (ii) the aggregate uncertainty measure and (iii) the choice
of macroeconomic controls can greatly affect conclusions.
[Please insert Table IV about here]
One possible reason for the unstable relation between investment and uncertainty is that
there isanomittedvariableconditioningthis relation. Webelievethatcreditors’ability tocontrol
managerial investmentbehavioruponcorrectlyidentifyingafirmasdistressedisthisconditioning
variable. The empirical evidence in Tables III and IV is consistent with this hypothesis. To see
this, note that, although many academics view the Z-score as a poor measure of distress (Grice
and Ingram (2001)), it is still extremely popular among practitioners.4 An implication is that,
although the Z-score may be a poor proxy for distress, it may efficiently capture the market’s
view of distress. In this case, the investment policies of firms perceived to be distressed should
be closely monitored by creditors, leading to the negative or close to zero relation between
investment and uncertainty reported in the tables. In contrast, distressed firms able to conceal
their health issues should end up among the genuinely healthy firms, producing great variations
in the relation between investment and uncertainty among firms perceived to be healthy because
different estimation specifications put a different emphasize on these firms.
Estimation of Model (3)
Table V offers the results from estimating model (3). We estimate the model employing the same
techniques as those used in Table III. Panel A offers coefficient estimates, and Panel B sums of
coefficient estimates indicating the effect of uncertainty on investment for different groups of
firms. In particular, β1 now shows this effect for healthy firms that were perceived as healthy by
creditors at the time, while the sum of β1 and β2 shows that for healthy firms that were perceived
as distressed. More importantly, the sum ofβ1,β2,β
′
3 (orβ
′′
3 orβ
′′′
3 ) andβ
′
4 (orβ
′′
4 orβ
′′′
4 ) measures
the effect of uncertainty on the investment behavior of distressed firms perceived as distressed at
4For example, a recent article in the Financial Times states that the Z-score is “a powerful, professional-
grade measure.” (Stevenson (2012)). Similarly, the Wall Street Journal refers to the Z-score as “the market
standard for predicting bankruptcy.” (McCracken (2008)).
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the time, and the sum of β1 and β
′
3 (or β
′′
3 or β
′′′
3 ) that of distressed firms that were perceived as
healthy. The prime indicates the distance-to-the bankruptcy filing date.
Healthy firms should optimally postpone investments when aggregate uncertainty is high,
implying that both β1 and the sum of β1 and β2 should be negative. In contrast, distressed firms
that were perceived as distressed have strong incentives to speed up investments when aggregate
uncertainty is high. However, if creditors correctly identify a firm as distressed, they may be able
to force managers to invest in a way that maximizes total firm value, and not only shareholder
value. If this were true, the sum ofβ1,β2,β
′
3 (orβ
′′
3 orβ
′′′
3 ) andβ
′
4 (orβ
′′
4 orβ
′′′
4 ) should be negative,
as for healthy firms.5 Finally, distressed firms that were not perceived as distressed both have
incentives to risk-shift and should be able to act upon these. As a result, the sum of β1 and β
′
3 (or
β
′′
3 or β
′′′
3 ) should be positive. Also, if risk-shifting incentives increase with the proximity to the
bankruptcy filing date, β3 should decrease with the number of its primes.
Using FEGLS combined with industry volatilities, we find an insignificantly negative effect
of aggregate uncertainty on investments for healthy firms perceived to be healthy (β1). However,
because β2 is strongly negative and large in magnitude, the sum of β1 and β2 is negative and
significant (-0.614, p-value< 0.000). The significant sum indicates that healthy firms perceived
tobedistressed significantlydecrease their investmentsasaggregateuncertainty increases. More
importantly, theβ
′
3, β
′′
3 andβ
′′′
3 coefficients are positive and significant. Addingβ1, the combined
coefficients are also positive and significant, with the magnitude of the combined coefficients
decreasing with the distance-to-the filing date. This is strong evidence indicating that distressed
firms perceived as healthy risk-shift and that risk-shifting becomes more prevalent the closer the
firm moves to the filing date. In contrast, the β
′
4, β
′′
4 and β
′′′
4 coefficients are always negative and
significant, implying that their sums withβ1, β2 andβ3 are either close to zero or are significantly
negative. As a result, distressed firms that were correctly identified as distressed do not risk-
shift, probably due to creditors monitoring their investment behavior. Using OLS and/or market
volatility does not materially affect any of these conclusions.
[Please insert Table V about here]
5Alternatively, they may force managers to not invest at all, leading to an insignificant relation. However,
the summary statistics in Table II make this option unlikely.
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It is interesting to analyze whether explicitly controlling for the ability of creditors to prevent
risk-shifting renders the relation between investment policy and aggregate uncertainty more sta-
ble. Table VI thus offers the results from estimating model (3) subject to the five modifications
used before. Across all of the five modifications, healthy firms always significantly postpone
investing when uncertainty is high, with the healthy firms perceived to be distressed in modifica-
tion 1 being the only exception. Not only are these results more consistent with the predictions
of real options model, they are also more consistent with the existing evidence on healthy firms
(e.g., Leahy and Whited (1995), Kim and Kung (2011)). We also always find strong evidence
indicating that distressed firms perceived to be healthy risk-shift, while those perceived to be
distressed do not risk-shift. Model (3) thus produces far more stable relations than model (1).
[Please insert Table VI about here]
3.3 Further Tests
Analyst Recommendations
Our conclusions depend crucially on our ability to classify distressed firms into those perceived as
healthyandthoseperceivedasdistressedat thetime. Toanalyze theaccuracyofourclassification
scheme, we thus next compare analyst recommendations across these two groups over the final
ten years before bankruptcy. We examine analyst recommendations because they reflect, and
sometimeseven influence, themarket’sviewaboutafirm’shealth(Womack(1996),LohandStulz
(2011)). If our classification scheme is efficient, we would expect that distressed firms perceived
to be healthy (those with low Z-scores) attract more favorable analyst recommendations than
those perceived to be distressed (those with high Z-scores). We obtain the analyst data over the
period from 1993 to 2008 from I/B/E/S. Analyst recommendations are coded on a five-point
scale, with a lower value indicating a better recommendation. In particular, values of 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5 indicate a ‘strong buy’, a ‘buy’, a ‘hold’, a ‘sell’ and a ‘strong sell’, respectively.
TableVIIshowsthatthemeanandmediananalystrecommendations(theI/B/E/Sconsensus
estimates) averaged over the entire ten year period (All) are more favorable for distressed firms
with high Z-scores (2.32 and 2.33, respectively) than for distressed firms with low Z-scores (2.11
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and 2.10, respectively), with these differences all being significant. Seven to ten years prior to
their bankruptcy, both groups of distressed firms attract analyst recommendations similar to
those of the healthy firms. However, from then to three to six years prior to the filing date, the
mean analyst recommendations of the correctly-identified firms worsen from 2.10 to 2.34, while
those of the incorrectly-identified firms change only marginally from 2.02 to 2.12. Even one to
two years prior to the filing date, the mean recommendation for incorrectly-identified distressed
firms does not exceed 2.18. The one of the correctly-identified firms also remains fairly stable over
the last seven years, implying that news about these firms’ health is incorporated into analyst
recommendations long before their actual bankruptcy. Similarly, the proportion of buy (sell)
recommendations is 51.52% (7.04%) for distressed firms with low Z-scores, while it is 62.31%
(3.52%) for distressed firms with high Z-scores, and these numbers evolve in a similar way as the
analyst recommendations over the ten year period prior to bankruptcy.
Although the analyst data provide some support for the notion that we can correctly dis-
tinguish between distressed firms that were perceived as healthy and those that were perceived
as distressed, the table reveals two surprising facts. First, even correctly-identified distressed
firms attract on average a more optimistic than pessimistic recommendation somewhere be-
tween ‘buy’ and ‘hold’. However, the optimistic bias might be due to analysts being in general
reluctant to issue negative recommendations, for example, to improve management access (Kim
(2001)). Second, even shortly before bankruptcy, analysts seem to be unable to correctly identify
all distressed firms. However, this evidence is consistent with the results in Jones and Johnstone
(forthcoming 2012), who examine a sample of large international bankruptcies and document
that analyst recommendations can be upwardly biased during the whole pre-bankruptcy period.
[Please insert Table VII about here]
Capital Expenditure Covenants
Our empirical results illustrate that, if a distressed firm can ex-ante be correctly identified as
distressedusingtheZ-score, thenthefirmdoesnotengage inrisk-shifting. However, theyso fardo
not show that it is creditors that keep these firms from risk-shifting. In this section, we offer some
16
evidence supporting this notion. To this end, we now study the number of capital expenditure
covenants that distressed firms are exposed to. If creditors employ capital expenditure covenants
to restrict managerial investment behavior, we would expect that correctly-identified distressed
firms are more exposed to such covenants than incorrectly-identified ones. The covenant data
used in these tests is retrieved from DealScan and cover the period 1996 to 2008.6
Table VIII reports the average number of capital expenditure covenants contained in the debt
contracts of the different groups of firms. Averaged over the ten year period prior to bankruptcy,
the distressed firms perceived as healthy were subject to an average of 0.126 capital expenditure
covenants, whereas those perceived as distressed were subject to an average of 0.218 ones. The
difference, 0.092, is highly significant. Seven to ten years before the filing date, the correctly-
identifieddistressedfirmsarealreadyexposed toanaverageof 0.194 restrictions, and this average
shoots up markedly to 0.244 during the final two years. In contrast, the incorrectly-identified
distressed firms are only exposed to an average of 0.096 restrictions seven to ten years before the
final date, which is lower than the average of healthy firms. Until two years before the filing date,
this average remains fairly constant, but then increases to 0.178. Interestingly, healthy firms
perceived as distressed are most exposed to capital expenditure restrictions (0.288). While this
evidence could be interpreted as creditors often restricting the investment policies of the wrong
type of firms, it is also consistent with capital expenditure restrictions preventing genuinely
distressed firms from risk-shifting and thereby increasing their survival chances.
Our results show that creditors use capital expenditure covenants to restrict the investment
policies of firms perceived as distressed. One caveat is that even firms identified as distressed are
only exposed to a small number of covenants. An explanation could be that creditors use other,
possibly informal, means to prevent risk-shifting. We turn to this possibility next.
External Capital
Creditors may control the investment behavior of firms perceived as distressed through threat-
ening to not lend further capital in the future. Such threats should only be effective if distressed
6The covenant data are often not comprehensive in DealScan before 1996. More details on DealScan and
the capital expenditure covenants are in Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009).
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firms have large capital requirements that cannot be completely met through raising equity. To
examine this possibility, Table IX offers evidence on the equity and debt issuances of our sam-
ple firms. We compute Net Equity Issued as the difference between the sale and the purchase
of common and preferred stock (sstk-prstkc) and Net Debt Issued as the difference between the
issuance and the redemption of long-term debt (dltis-dltr). We follow Frank and Goyal (2003)
and scale both variables by beginning-of-period net assets, defined as total assets less current
liabilities (at-lct). The data used to create these variables are from COMPUSTAT.
[Please insert Table IX about here]
The table reports that distressed firms perceived as distressed are the largest issuer of eq-
uity, raising an average of 18.43% of their net assets in equity over the ten-year period prior to
bankruptcy. However, these firms also raise a large amount of debt capital, similar to that of
distressed firms perceived as healthy and larger than that of healthy firms. This result suggests
that the new equity raised by distressed firms perceived as distressed is not sufficient to com-
pletely cover their financing needs. Seven to ten years prior to bankruptcy, correctly-identified
distressed firms raise an average of 18.16% in equity. This average increases to 21.91% three to
six years prior to the filing date, but drops substantially to 14.77% over the final two years. The
drop from 21.91% to 14.77% could signal that it becomes more difficult to raise equity capital
shortly before bankruptcy. In contrast, the average amount of debt raised increases monoton-
ically from 2.65% to 6.78%, suggesting that debt capital becomes relatively more important as
the filing date approaches. The incorrectly-identified distressed firms raise 11.33% of their as-
sets in equity and 5.25% in debt seven to ten years prior to bankruptcy, and these values increase
monotonically to 15.13% and 10.67%, respectively, in the final two years.
Overall, distressed firms depend more strongly on external funding than healthy firms. In
general, equityholdersanddebtholdersarewillingtoprovidethisfunding,althoughequityholders
seem to become slightly less willing shortly before bankruptcy. Distressed firms hence depend
strongly on their creditors, with this dependence increasing as the filing date approaches. As a
result, creditors may be able to force managers to invest in a way that maximizes their stake in
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the company. The ability of creditors to influence managerial investment behavior may be one
reason for why creditors are still willing to lend money to distressed firms.
Non-US Markets
We finally study risk-shifting in three non-US markets, Germany, Japan and the UK. These tests
servetwopurposes. First, theyshowthatourresultsarerobustout-of-sample. Second, theyallow
us to analyze whether there are cross-sectional variations in risk-shifting due to, for example,
bankruptcy law and/or financing regime. Bankruptcy codes favouring the interests of creditors
over those of stockholders (the German and UK codes) might possibly produce greater incentives
to risk-shift and thus more risk-shifting. Also, creditors in bank-orientated systems (Germany
and Japan) are often reasoned to be more knowledgeable about their clients than those in capital
market-orientated systems (the UK and the US). It is possible that this greater knowledge allows
them to identify distress more timely, leading to less risk-shifting. The German, Japanese and
UK bankruptcy filing data are collected from the website of the Frankfurter Bo¨rse, the Teikoku
Database and the London Business School Share Price Database, respectively.7 We obtain the
non-US market and accounting data from DataStream and WorldScope, respectively.8
Table X shows the results of estimating model (3) on non-US data. In these tests, we analyze
the sample period from 1990 to 2008, first because our non-US bankruptcy data start in 1996
and second because 1990 is the earliest year for which a large number of non-US firms have
complete data. We again remove all firms that dropped out of the sample prior to 1996. For
comparison, the table also reports the results obtained from US data over the same period. Using
FEGLS and industry volatilities, the non-US results are very similar to the US ones. In each
country, the β
′
3, β
′′
3 , β
′′′
3 coefficients are always positive and often significant, while the β
′
4, β
′′
4 ,
7We have verified that the German filing data are consistent with the data contained in the Hoppenstedt
Database. We are very grateful to Cindy Y. Shirata from the Department of Accounting and Finance at the
University of Tsukuba Tokio for providing us with the Japanese data. The UK data has been extended using
hand-collected data from the London Stock Exchange website.
8We use the following DataStream/Worldscope data items: Capital Expenditures (WC04601), PP&E
(WC02301), Total Assets (WC02999), Working Capital (WC03151), Retained Earnings (WC03495), EBIT
(WC18191); the market value of equity (MV), the book value of debt (WC03351), Sales (WC01001),
the book value of assets (WC03501), the book value of long-term debt (WC03351) and the cash flow
(WC01551+WC01151).
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β
′′′
4 coefficients are almost always negative and significant (Panel A). Adding slope coefficients, it
becomes obvious that distressed firms perceived as healthy show some signs of risk-shifting in all
countries, whereas distressed firms perceived as distressed hardly ever risk-shift (Panel B). Our
results do not materially change when industry volatilities are substituted for market volatility
or when the models are estimated using OLS (unreported).
Overall, our evidence suggests that risk-shifting does not vary across countries with different
bankruptcy codes and/or financing regimes. This evidence could be interpreted as indicating
that neither do stronger creditor rights increase risk-shifting incentives, nor do closer lending
relations allow creditors to more effectively prevent risk-shifting.
[Please insert Table X about here]
4 Conclusion
Although neoclassical finance theory argues that distressed firms have incentives to substitute
low risk assets for high risk ones, there is so far little evidence documenting such behavior in
practice (Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Parrino and Weisbach (1999)). One possible reason for
this lack of evidence could be that creditors can sometimes control the investment behavior of
distressed firms. For example, creditors could use debt covenants as a formal means to restrict
managerial behavior. However, they could also use more subtle means, such as the threat to not
roll over short-term debt if managers tried to risk-shift. Our empirical evidence is consistent with
this hypothesis. Assuming that creditors are only able to prevent risk-shifting if they correctly
identifyafirmasdistressed, weuseex-postbankruptcyfilingsasaproxy fordistressandAltman’s
(1968) Z-score as a proxy for creditors’ perception of distress. Supporting our proxy variables,
the firms that we classify as correctly identified distressed firms obtain significantly worse analyst
recommendations than those that we classify as incorrectly identified. We next show that only
those distressed firms that were not identified as distressed speed up investments as uncertainty
increases, which is one specific case of risk-shifting (Eisdorfer (2008)). Also consistent with our
hypothesis, we show that the non-correctly identified distressed firms are less restricted by debt
20
covenants than the incorrectly identified ones, but that both types of distressed firms require
large amounts of external capital, making them susceptible to creditor threats.
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Table II
Summary Statistics for Distressed Firms Over The Final Ten Years
This table offers the median analysis variables for the sample of distressed (future bankrupt)
firms over the final ten year prior to bankruptcy. The medians are computed separately
for those firms with a Z-score below 1.81 (firms perceived as distressed, Panel A) and those
with one above 1.81 (firms perceived as healthy, Panel B). Panels C and D present the
median analysis variables for non-bankrupt healthy (Z-score above 1.81) and non-bankrupt
distressed (Z-score below 1.81) firms. All variables are defined as indicated in the caption
of Table I and winsorized at the top and the bottom one percentile. a (b) indicates that the
difference in medians across the samples in Panels A and B (C and D) is significant at the
1%-level according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
T Obs Total Assets Investment Z-score Mkt-to-Bk Leverage Cash Flow
Panel A: Distressed Firms Correctly Identified by Z-Score
-10 89 101.540 0.064a 0.865a 1.204a 0.656a 0.058a
-9 109 83.166 0.074a 0.938a 1.273a 0.586a 0.040a
-8 127 144.900 0.067a 0.922a 0.986a 0.629a 0.044a
-7 161 105.499 0.074a 0.908a 1.257a 0.590a 0.019a
-6 182 93.827 0.061a 0.689a 1.333a 0.606a -0.068a
-5 244 80.194a 0.079a 0.471a 1.087a 0.594a -0.026a
-4 303 86.159a 0.088a 0.631a 1.239a 0.598a -0.009a
-3 355 94.926 0.070a 0.548a 0.948a 0.646a -0.082a
-2 483 92.007 0.069a 0.534a 0.991a 0.622a -0.168a
-1 536 124.255 0.054a 0.273a 0.779a 0.688a -0.330
Average 89.000a 0.068a 0.684a 1.084a 0.624a -0.065a
Panel B: Distressed Firms Not Correctly Identified by Z-Score
-10 322 102.473 0.151 3.745 1.708 0.349 0.171
-9 340 117.288 0.139 3.788 1.728 0.341 0.178
-8 393 109.154 0.150 3.960 1.887 0.324 0.165
-7 426 110.833 0.155 3.926 1.987 0.317 0.152
-6 469 110.021 0.167 3.813 1.839 0.335 0.139
-5 493 133.478 0.138 3.547 1.710 0.374 0.113
-4 505 144.566 0.141 3.359 1.771 0.357 0.091
-3 525 138.148 0.134 3.283 1.856 0.360 0.059
-2 488 149.415 0.138 3.362 1.722 0.411 -0.044
-1 356 137.846 0.140 3.217 1.886 0.431 -0.272
Average 124.400 0.142 3.632 1.716 0.367 0.123
Panel C: Healthy Firms Correctly Identified by the Z-Score
NA 5,868 197.008b 0.134b 4.369b 2.094b 0.253b 0.207b
Panel D: Healthy Firms Not Correctly Identified by the Z-Score
NA 2,663 173.916 0.079 0.948 1.395 0.538 0.056
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Table III
The Relation Between Investment and Expected Volatility
The table reports the results of regressions of investment on expected volatility and controls (model (1)). The
dependent variable is capital expenditures scaled by start-of-period gross plant, property and equipment. Param-
eter estimates (in bold) and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported in Panel A. Panel B reports the sum of
various combinations of slope coefficients indicating the effect of volatility on investment for either firms perceived
to be healthy (Z-score above 1.81) or firms perceived to be distressed (Z-score below 1.81). ‘Industry (Market)
Volatility’ indicates that expected volatility is measured at the industry (market) level. FEGLS reports the re-
sults of industry fixed effects regressions with heteroscedasticity-robust (White) standard errors. OLS reports the
results of OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the industry and year levels. All variables are defined
as in the caption of Table I. While investment is measured over the fiscal year, all exogenous variables are mea-
sured at its start, with the exception of Cash Flow, which is contemporaneous with investment. Significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Industry Volatility Market Volatility
FEGLS OLS FEGLS OLS
Panel A: Full Regressions
PercDistress −0.014* 0.011 −0.035*** −0.022
(0.008) (0.048) (0.010) (0.034)
Expected Volatlity (β1) −0.060 0.228 0.253** 0.233
(0.070) (0.434) (0.104) (0.501)
PercDistress x Exp. Volatility (β2) −0.477*** −0.660 −0.196 −0.185
(0.119) (0.471) (0.215) (0.164)
LN(Total Assets) −0.017*** −0.015*** −0.017*** −0.015***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Market-to-Book 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Market Leverage −0.278*** −0.259*** −0.280*** −0.260***
(0.006) (0.030) (0.006) (0.036)
Cash Flow −0.022*** −0.020*** −0.022*** −0.020***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
GDP Growth 0.011*** 0.011** 0.011*** 0.011**
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006)
Constant 0.306*** 0.314*** 0.295*** 0.318***
(0.009) (0.034) (0.010) (0.045)
Observations 75,307 75,307 75,307 75,307
Adjusted R-squared 0.137 0.120 0.139 0.120
Panel B: Risk-Shifting Behavior Across Groups of Firms
Perceived as healthy:
β1 −0.060 0.228 0.253** 0.233
Perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 −0.536*** −0.431 0.057 0.048
27
Table IV
The Relation Between Investment and Expected Volatility - Robustness Tests
This table reports the slope coefficients from regressions of investment on expected volatility and controls
(model (1)) for firms perceived to be healthy (Z-score above 1.81) and those perceived to be distressed
(Z-score below 1.81). Regressions are performed with industry fixed effects (FEGLS). ‘Industry (Market)
Volatility’ indicates that expected volatility is measured at the industry (market) level. ‘Base model’
repeats the results from Table 3. In Variations 1 (‘3 MacroControls’) and 2 (‘No MacroControls’), we
substitute GDP growth for Interest, Spread and Recession or we omit the macroeconomic control variables.
In Variation 3 (‘Capex/TA’), investment is measured as the ratio of annual capital expenditures to book
value of total assets at the start of the period. In Variation 4 (‘Net Inv’), investment is measured as the
ratio of capital expenditures net of sale of assets divided by lagged PP&E. In Variation 5 (‘Total Inv’),
investment is measured as the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures and acquisitions minus sales
of PP&E, divided by lagged PP&E. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***, respectively.
Industry Volatility Market Volatility
Perceived as Perceived as Perceived as Perceived as
Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed
β1 β1 + β2 β1 β1 + β2
Base Model −0.060 −0.536*** 0.253** 0.057
Var 1: 3 MacroControls −0.224*** −0.516 0.027 0.175
Var 2: No MacroControls −0.142** −0.652*** 0.055 −0.106
Var 3: CAPEX/TA −0.060 −0.536 0.253** 0.057
Var 4: Net Inv −0.119*** −0.454*** 0.129* −0.076
Var 5: Total Inv −1.004*** −3.588*** −1.041*** −1.807**
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Table V
Firm’s Investment, Distress Risk and Risk-Shifting
The table reports results for regressions of the investment on expected volatility, distress dummy and
second- and third-level interaction effects of distress and pre-bankruptcy years (regression specification
II). Panel A reports full regression results where the same control variables as in the original model in
equation (2) are included but not reported. Panel B reports the slope coefficient on expected volatility
from regression specification II for different types of firms. FEGLS corresponds to industry fixed effects
regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust (White) standard errors. OLS corresponds to OLS regressions
with robust standard errors clustered at the industry and year levels. Levels of significance are indicated
by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Industry Volatility Market Volatility
FEGLS OLS FEGLS OLS
Panel A: Full Regressions
PercDistress −0.009 0.017 −0.032*** −0.018
(0.008) (0.051) (0.010) (0.029)
Expected Volatlity (β1) −0.109 0.170 0.156 0.122
(0.069) (0.425) (0.104) (0.490)
PercDistress x Exp. Volatility (β2) −0.505*** −0.673 −0.214 −0.165
(0.116) (0.471) (0.213) (0.198)
T[-1;-2] x Exp. Volatility (β
′
3) 1.887*** 2.108*** 2.354*** 2.672***
(0.291) (0.519) (0.372) (0.703)
T[-3;-6] x Exp. Volatility (β
′′
3 ) 0.983*** 1.122*** 1.190*** 1.396***
(0.165) (0.230) (0.207) (0.375)
T[-7;-10] x Exp. Volatility (β
′′′
3 ) 0.711*** 0.807** 0.976*** 1.109**
(0.156) (0.316) (0.213) (0.447)
PercDistress x T[-1;-2] x Exp. Volatility (β
′
4) −1.262*** −1.559*** −1.455*** −1.889***
(0.339) (0.480) (0.444) (0.647)
PercDistress x T[-3;-6] x Exp. Volatility (β
′′
4 ) −0.735*** −0.935** −0.833*** −1.138**
(0.240) (0.376) (0.314) (0.537)
PercDistress x T[-7;-10] x Exp. Volatility (β
′′′
4 ) −0.640** −0.743* −0.815** −0.976*
(0.272) (0.410) (0.395) (0.565)
Observations 75,307 75,307 75,307 75,307
Adjusted R-squared 0.139 0.124 0.139 0.123
Panel B: Risk-Shifting Behavior Across Groups of Firms
Healthy firms perceived as healthy:
β1 −0.109 0.170 0.156 0.122
Healthy firms perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 −0.614*** −0.503 −0.059 −0.043
Distressed firms perceived as healthy:
β1 + β
′
3 1.778*** 2.278*** 2.510*** 2.794***
β1 + β
′′
3 0.874*** 1.292*** 1.346*** 1.518**
β1 + β
′′′
3 0.602*** 0.977** 1.132*** 1.231**
Distressed firms perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 + β
′
3 + β
′
4 0.011 0.045 0.840*** 0.740
β1 + β2 + β
′′
3 + β
′′
4 −0.366* −0.316 0.299 0.215
β1 + β2 + β
′′′
3 + β
′′′
4 −0.543** −0.440 0.102 0.090
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Table VI
Firm’s Investment, Distress Risk and Risk-Shifting - Robustness Checks
This table reports the slope coefficients of expected volatility from regressions of investment on
expected volatility and controls (model (3)) for different groups of firms. The different groups of
firms are healthy firms perceived as healthy, healthy firms perceived as distressed, distressed firms
perceived as healthy and distressed firms perceived as distressed. The regressions are performed
with industry fixed effects (FEGLS). In Panel A (B), expected volatility is measured at the industry
(market) level. The model variations are defined in the caption of Table IV. Significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Var 1 Var 2 Var 3 Var 4 Var 5
Panel A: Industry Volatility
Healthy firms perceived as healthy:
β1 −0.296*** −0.189*** −0.070*** −0.148*** −1.085***
Healthy firms perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 −0.618 −0.732*** −0.087** −0.539*** −3.488***
Distressed firms perceived as healthy:
β1 + β
′
3 1.747*** 1.777*** 0.236*** 0.749*** 1.389*
β1 + β
′′
3 0.784*** 0.856*** 0.084* 0.483*** 0.654
β1 + β
′′′
3 0.329* 0.522*** 0.079* 0.650*** 0.872*
Distressed firms perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 + β
′
3 + β
′
4 0.087 −0.044 0.081 0.083 −4.085***
β1 + β2 + β
′′
3 + β
′′
4 −0.272 −0.446** −0.029 −0.207* −3.948***
β1 + β2 + β
′′′
3 + β
′′′
4 −0.705*** −0.633** −0.133 −0.429** −3.921***
Panel B: Market Volatility
Healthy firms perceived as healthy:
β1 −0.114 −0.036 0.005 0.067 −1.241***
Healthy firms perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 0.010 −0.227 −0.311*** −0.201 −1.618**
Distressed firms perceived as healthy:
β1 + β
′
3 2.479*** 2.445*** 0.362*** 1.157*** 2.535***
β1 + β
′′
3 1.233*** 1.247*** 0.168*** 0.888*** 1.454**
β1 + β
′′′
3 0.750*** 0.943*** 0.200*** 1.102*** 1.460**
Distressed firms perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 + β
′
3 + β
′
4 1.030*** 0.773** -0.061 0.660*** −2.582***
β1 + β2 + β
′′
3 + β
′′
4 0.516* 0.190 −0.233*** 0.285 −2.335***
β1 + β2 + β
′′′
3 + β
′′′
4 −0.030 −0.014 −0.377*** 0.001 −2.187*
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Table VIII
Capital Expenditure Covenants and Risk-Shifting Behavior
The table studies the number of capital expenditure covenants contained in the debt covenants
of four different groups of firms. Panel A analyzes the covenants of distressed (future bankrupt)
firms with a Z-score either below 1.81 (‘low Z’, firms perceived as distressed) or above 1.81 (‘high
Z’, firms perceived as healthy). Panel B analyzes the covenants of healthy (non-bankrupt) firms
with a Z-score either below 1.81 (‘low Z’, firms perceived as distressed) or above 1.81 (‘high Z’,
firms perceived as healthy). *, **, and *** indicate that the difference in means across high and
low Z-score firms is greater than zero at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10% level, respectively (based on a
one-sided t-test).
Obs Mean Standard Deviations
T low Z high Z low Z high Z diff low Z high Z
Panel A: Distressed Firms Correctly/Incorrectly Identified by the Z-Score
-10 to -7 62 229 0.194 0.096 0.098* 0.474 0.324
-6 to -3 278 508 0.194 0.112 0.082*** 0.494 0.362
-2 to -1 312 269 0.244 0.178 0.066* 0.542 0.429
All 652 1,006 0.218 0.126 0.092*** 0.516 0.375
Panel B: Healthy Firms Incorrectly/Correctly Identified by the Z-Score
N/A 3,180 16,382 0.287 0.169 0.118*** 0.644 0.499
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Table IX
Equity and Debt Issuances of Healthy and Distressed Firms
The table reports the mean equity and debt issued by four different groups of firms.
Panel A and B study issuances of bankrupt firms that have been and that have not been
identified as distressed in any of the ten years prior to bankruptcy, respectively. Panels C
and D study issuances of non-bankrupt firms that have been or have not been identified
as distressed by the Z-Score, respectively. Net Equity Issued is defined as the difference
between the sale and the purchase of common and preferred stock divided by net assets.
Net Debt Issued is defined as the difference between the issuance and the reduction of
long-term debt divided by net assets. Net assets is total assets minus current liabilities.
The significance of the differences across Panels A and B (or C and D) at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level according to the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is indicated by *, **, and ***,
respectively (two-sided test).
Firm-Year Net Equity Issued Net Debt Issued
T Obs Obs Mean StDev Mean StDev
Panel A: Distressed Firms Correctly Identified by Z-Score (Low Z-score)
-10 to -7 207 414 0.1816* 0.5241 0.0265* 0.2921
-6 to -3 431 914 0.2191*** 0.5813 0.0640 0.3334
-2 to -1 588 842 0.1477 0.4684 0.0678** 0.3103
All 680 2,170 0.1843*** 0.5297 0.0583* 0.3172
Panel B: Distressed Firms Not Correctly Identified by Z-Score (High Z-score)
-10 to -7 466 1,132 0.1133* 0.3851 0.0525 0.2205
-6 to -3 643 1,449 0.1190*** 0.3896 0.0768 0.2615
-2 to -1 499 603 0.1513 0.4332 0.1067** 0.2898
All 858 3,184 0.1231*** 0.3968 0.0738* 0.2542
Panel C: Healthy Firms Not Correctly Identified by the Z-Score (Low Z-score)
N/A 2,622 10,400 0.1411*** 0.4298 0.0180*** 0.2404
Panel D: Healthy Firms Correctly Identified by the Z-Score (High Z-score)
N/A 5,751 50,700 0.0516*** 0.2805 0.0324*** 0.1762
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Table X
Firm’s Investment, Distress Risk and Risk-Shifting
Out-of-Sample Robustness Tests
The table reports results of regressions of investment on expected volatility and controls, allowing
the relation between investment and volatility to vary across four groups of firms (model (3))
and using data from Germany, Japan, the UK and the US. The regressions are performed
with industry fixed effects (FEGLS). Parameter estimates (in bold) and standard errors (in
parentheses) are reported in Panel A. For the sake of brevity, the table does not report the slope
coefficients of the control variables. Panel B reports the sum of various combinations of slope
coefficients indicating the effect of volatility on investment for healthy firms perceived as healthy,
healthy firms perceived as distressed, distressed firms perceived as healthy and distressed firms
perceived as distressed. Expected volatility is measured at the industry level. All other variables
are defined as in Table I. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***, respectively.
GER JPN UK US
Panel A: Full Regressions
PercDistress 0.061*** 0.000 0.009 −0.014
(0.023) (0.014) (0.029) (0.010)
Expected Volatlity (β1) 0.126 0.165 −0.221 −0.575***
(0.280) (0.160) (0.262) (0.089)
PercDistress x Exp. Volatility (β2) −0.553* 0.112 −0.600 −0.322**
(0.308) (0.206) (0.448) (0.134)
T[-1;-2] x Exp. Volatility (β
′
3) 3.402*** 1.367 1.300* 2.202***
(1.102) (0.952) (0.676) (0.331)
T[-3;-6] x Exp. Volatility (β
′′
3 ) 0.624 2.600** 1.130*** 0.885***
(0.532) (1.094) (0.397) (0.188)
T[-7;-10] x Exp. Volatility (β
′′′
3 ) 0.431 0.116 0.654 0.586***
(0.655) (0.182) (0.423) (0.171)
PercDistress x T[-1;-2] x Exp. Volatility (β
′
4) −2.503* −1.177 −0.935 −1.597***
(1.366) (0.974) (0.748) (0.374)
PercDistress x T[-3;-6] x Exp. Volatility (β
′′
4 ) 0.182 −2.558** −0.633 −0.527*
(0.844) (1.105) (0.630) (0.276)
PercDistress x T[-7;-10] x Exp. Volatility (β
′′′
4 ) −0.036 0.138 −0.306 −0.722**
(0.718) (0.374) (0.580) (0.284)
Observations 3,024 7,371 19,966 55,762
Adjusted R-squared 0.142 0.284 0.182 0.163
Panel B: Risk-Shifting Behavior Across Different Groups of Firms
Healthy firms perceived as healthy:
β1 0.126 0.165 −0.221 −0.575***
Healthy firms perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 −0.427 0.276 −0.822** −0.898***
Distressed firms perceived as healthy:
β1 + β
′
3 3.529*** 1.531 1.079 1.627***
β1 + β
′′
3 0.751 2.764** 0.909* 0.310
β1 + β
′′′
3 0.557 0.281 0.433 0.011
Distressed firms perceived as distressed:
β1 + β2 + β
′
3 + β
′
4 0.473 0.466* −0.457 −0.293
β1 + β2 + β
′′
3 + β
′′
4 0.380 0.318 −0.325 −0.539**
β1 + β2 + β
′′′
3 + β
′′′
4 −0.032 0.531 −0.473 −1.033***
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Figure 1. GARCH(1,1) expected volatility estimates. The solid black line represents ex-
pected volatility estimated at the market level using a GARCH(1,1) model on the monthly returns
of the CRSP value-weighted US market index. The solid grey line represents the average of expected
volatility estimated at the industry level using a GARCH(1,1) model on the monthly returns of thirty
value-weighted industry portfolios. The values for the market and industry volatilities are plotted
on the left y-axis. The industry portfolios are defined following the industry classification scheme of
Kenneth French. The estimation is performed recursively over the 1927-2008 period, with recursion
starting in 1979. The dashed black line represents expected volatility computed using the VIX in-
dex over the 1986-2008 period. The values for the VIX-volatility are plotted on the right y-axis. The
shaded areas denote recession periods, as defined by the NBER.
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